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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE CORPORATIST TURN IN AMERICAN 
REGULATION 
When President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law on July 
21, 2010, he began a new epoch in financial regulation. The old epoch 
dated back to the early 1930s, when President Roosevelt and the New Deal 
Congress enacted the securities acts of 1933 and 1934, as well as banking 
reforms that broke up the giant Wall Street banks and put deposit insurance 
in place for the first time. Never again, they promised, would investors be 
forced to live by their critical wits in unregulated markets, or ordinary 
Americans lose their life savings if their bank failed. 
The new legislation comes in the third year of the worst American 
financial crisis since the Great Depression, a crisis that was exacerbated by 
financial instruments and new forms of financing that were not dreamed of 
in that earlier era. Most Americans had never even heard of the financial 
assembly line known as securitization before the collapse of major 
mortgage lenders like Countrywide and the more cataclysmic failures of 
Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and American 
International Group (AIG). Many still don’t understand just what this 
process is all about—other than to repeat familiar clichés about the “slicing 
and dicing” of mortgages—but they know that the failure to adequately 
regulate these innovations has figured prominently in the crisis. 
After watching the government bail out Bear Stearns and AIG in 
2008, and pump well over one hundred billion dollars into Citigroup, Bank 
of America, and the other big banks the same year, Americans also know 
that the existing regulatory framework could not adequately oversee our 
largest financial institutions. Perhaps the best evidence of just how rickety 
that old regulatory structure was can be found in the best-selling books 
about the financial crisis. Bill Cohan’s House of Cards showed just how 
little the nation’s top regulators—then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, 
Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, and then-head of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—knew about Bear Stearns’s 
financial condition as they decided the investment bank’s fate. Andrew 
Ross Sorkin’s riveting page-turner on the crisis, Too Big to Fail, revealed 
just how unscripted and unnervingly ad hoc the decisions whether to 
nationalize (as with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), let go (as with Lehman 
Brothers), or bail out (as with AIG) were in the calamitous months that 
followed. The picture of one page from Henry Paulson’s phone log in 
Sorkin’s book is enough to make one’s heart stop.1 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act—the Dodd-Frank Act for short—is the response to Americans’ call for 
help, for a new regulatory framework for the twenty-first century. To 
understand what American financial life is likely to look like in five, 10, or 
20 years, and how regulators may  respond to the next crisis, we need to 
understand the Dodd-Frank Act: both what it says and what it means. This, 
in a nutshell, is what the book you are reading is about. 
The Path to Enactment 
The Dodd-Frank Act got its start in March 2009, when the 
Department of the Treasury released a framework it called “Rules for the 
Regulatory Road” shortly before a major meeting of the G-20 nations. 
Treasury released a more complete White Paper and proposed legislative 
language several months later. The White Paper would provide the template 
for all of the major parts of the legislation that eventually passed. 
Throughout the summer and fall of 2009, Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner and other defenders of the proposed legislation were hammered by 
critics. On the right, the emerging Tea Party movement lumped the 
financial reforms together with the health care reform proposals as evidence 
of the Big Government inclinations of the Obama administration, and 
condemned the reforms as institutionalizing the bailout policies of 2008. 
Many on the left were equally critical. For liberal critics, the bailouts and 
the proposed legislation suggested that the administration was catering to 
Wall Street, while doing very little to ease the suffering that the financial 
crisis had brought to Main Street. 
In response to these criticisms, the administration tightened up 
portions of the legislation that could be construed as inviting bailouts. They 
also insisted that the legislation wouldn’t perpetuate the bailouts of the 
prior year. By giving regulators the power to dismantle systemically 
important financial institutions that were on the brink of collapse, they 
argued, it actually would end the use of bailouts. 
The next major step toward enactment came when Congressman 
Barney Frank steered a version of the proposed legislation through his 
Financial Services Committee, and then, on December 11, 2009, through 
the House of Representatives. 
In January 2009, the Obama administration was forced to make a 
major concession to populist criticism of the legislation by the stunning 
victory of Republican Scott Brown in the election to fill Edward Kennedy’s 
Senate seat in Massachusetts. Two days after Brown’s election, President 
Obama endorsed a proposal by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul 
Volcker that would ban banks from engaging in proprietary trading—that 
is, trading for their own accounts. Until the Brown election, the 
administration had resisted the proposal as an undesirable interference with 
the activities of the big banks. 
Even after this shift, the fate of the legislation remained uncertain for 
several months. Given the heavy Democratic majorities in Congress and the 
obvious inadequacies of existing regulation, most observers thought some 
version of the legislation would pass. But it wasn’t clear what version, or 
when. 
The pivotal push once again came from outside the halls of 
Congress. On April 19, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
sued Goldman Sachs, which had emerged as a principal villain of the 
financial crisis—“a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of 
humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells 
like money,” in the immortal words of Rolling Stone magazine. Approved 
by a 3 to 2 vote of the SEC’s commissioners, the SEC lawsuit alleged that 
Goldman had defrauded investors by failing to tell them that the mortgage-
related investments it had sold them were picked in part by a hedge fund 
that was betting that the mortgages would default. The securities fraud 
allegations transformed the political landscape, shifting the momentum 
decisively in favor of the legislation. On May 20, the Senate passed its 
version, known as the Dodd Bill after Senate Banking Committee Chair 
Christopher Dodd. In the ensuing two months, a conference committee 
worked out the differences between the two bills, and with the President’s 
signature, Dodd-Frank was born.2  
The Two Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act 
Contrary to rumors that the Dodd-Frank Act is an incoherent mess, 
the Wall Street Reform portion of its 2,319 pages (a mere 800 or so when 
the margins and spacing have been squeezed) has two very clear objectives. 
Its first objective is to limit the risk of contemporary finance—what critics 
often call the shadow banking system; and the second is to limit the damage 
caused by the failure of a large financial institution. (Although the Wall 
Street reforms are this book’s particular focus, it also devotes a chapter to 
the new consumer regulator, which is the heart of Dodd-Frank’s 
contribution to consumer protection.) 
The Dodd-Frank Act tackles the first task by putting brand-new 
regulatory structures in place for both the instruments and the institutions of 
the new financial world. The principal instruments in question are 
derivatives. A derivative is simply a contract between two parties (each 
called a counterparty), whose value is based on changes in the price of an 
interest rate, currency, or almost anything else, or on the occurrence of 
some specified event (such as a company’s default). An airline may buy an 
oil derivative—a contract under which it will be paid if the price of oil has 
risen at the end of the contract term—to hedge against changes in oil prices. 
Southwest Air’s judicious use of these derivatives was one of the keys to its 
early success. 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s main strategy for managing the riskiness of 
these contracts is to require that derivatives be cleared and traded on 
exchanges. To clear a derivative (or anything else, for that matter), the 
parties arrange for a clearinghouse to backstop both parties’ performance 
on the contract. If the bank that had sold Southwest an oil derivative failed, 
for instance, the clearinghouse would pay Southwest the difference between 
the current and original oil price or would pay for Southwest to buy a 
substitute contract. If the same derivative were exchange traded, it would 
have standardized terms and would be purchased on an organized 
exchange, rather than negotiated privately by Southwest and the bank. 
Clearing reduces the risk to each of the parties directly, while exchange 
trading reduces risk to them and to the financial system indirectly by 
making the derivatives market more transparent. 
To better regulate institutions, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to single 
out the financial institutions that are most likely to cause systemwide 
problems if they fail, and subjects them to more intensive regulation. The 
legislation focuses in particular on bank holding companies that have at 
least $50 billion in assets, and nonbank financial institutions such as 
investment banks or insurance holding companies that a new Financial 
Stability Oversight Council deems to be systemically important. (“Bank” in 
this context means a commercial bank—a bank that accepts customer 
deposits. A bank holding company is a group of affiliated companies that 
has at least one commercial bank somewhere in the network, or has chosen 
to be subject to banking regulation, as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
did in the fall of 2008. I will sometimes use “bank” to refer to either.) 
Banks like Citigroup or Bank of America automatically qualify, as do 34 
others, whereas an insurance company like AIG will be included only if the 
Council identifies it as systemically important. The Dodd-Frank Act 
instructs regulators to require that these systemically important firms keep a 
larger buffer of capital than ordinary financial institutions, to reduce the 
danger that they will fail.3 
If Dodd-Frank’s first objective is to limit risk before the fact—
before an institution or market collapses—the second objective is to limit 
the destruction caused in the event that a systemically important institution 
does indeed fail, despite everyone’s best efforts to prevent that from 
happening. For this second objective, the legislation introduces a new 
insolvency framework—the Dodd-Frank resolution rules. If regulators find 
that a systemically important financial institution has defaulted or is in 
danger of default, they can file a petition in federal court in Washington, 
D.C., commencing resolution proceedings, and appoint the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver to take over the financial 
institution and liquidate it, much as the FDIC has long done with ordinary 
commercial banks.  
Like the New Deal reforms, which gave us the FDIC and the SEC, 
among others, the Dodd-Frank Act creates several new regulators to 
achieve these two objectives, including the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, whose members include the heads of all the major financial 
regulators, and a new federal insurance regulator. I have already mentioned 
that the other major new regulator (the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau) will also come into our story, in part as a foil to the key Wall Street 
banks. 
A Brief Tour of Other Reforms 
Throughout, the book focuses primarily on the reforms that relate 
most directly to the two goals just described. Although these are the most 
important of the reforms, several others have received significant attention. 
I give each at least glancing comment elsewhere in the book, but it may be 
useful to identify them briefly and more explicitly here. 
The first two are a pair of corporate governance reforms, each of 
which is designed to give shareholders more authority. The more important 
of the two is a provision that simply gives the SEC the power to require a 
company to include shareholder nominees for director along with the 
company’s own nominees when it sends proxy materials to all of its 
shareholders before its annual meeting. The SEC has already taken 
advantage of this authority, approving a regulation that will allow 
shareholders with at least 3 percent of a corporation’s stock to include 
nominees for up to 25 percent of the directorial positions. The second, 
which was one of President Obama’s campaign promises, will require that 
shareholders be given a nonbinding vote on the compensation packages of 
the company’s directors and top executives.  Neither is likely to have a 
particularly large effect, although the first—known as proxy access—has 
generated anxiety in directorial circles. These critics complain that unions 
and pensions will use the new shareholder power to promote their own 
agendas.4  
The Dodd-Frank Act also took aim at a few of the problems 
plaguing the credit rating industry. The credit rating agencies—Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch—did a notoriously poor job 
with the mortgage-related securities at the heart of the subprime crisis, 
handing out investment grade ratings to many securities that later defaulted. 
One problem with the current system is that the bank whose securities are 
being rated pays for the rating. (As my students like to say, it’s as if a 
school used a grading system in which students paid for their grades.) 
Although the legislation did not eliminate the “issuer pays” feature of credit 
ratings, it requires financial regulators to change the many rules that require 
entities like pension funds and insurance companies to buy securities that 
are certified as investment grade by a credit rating agency. These changes, 
it is hoped, willdiminish the pressure to rely on credit rating agencies.  
Removal of the artificial demand for credit rated securities could 
significantly improve the credit rating process. Dodd-Frank also includes a 
variety of new rules for the governance of a rating agency.5 
Finally, the legislation requires hedge funds to register for the first 
time. In the past, the defining characteristic of hedge funds was their 
exclusion from securities laws and related regulation that would otherwise 
require disclosure and oversight. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, hedge fund 
advisers must now register and make themselves available for periodic 
inspections.6 
Each of these new provisions is related to the two principal 
objectives of the Act, but each is more at the periphery than the center. The 
core is Dodd-Frank’s treatment of derivatives, its regulation of systemically 
important financial institutions, and its new rules for resolving their 
financial distress, together with the counterweight of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau. 
Two Themes That Emerge 
I wish I could say that the new regulatory regime will be as 
successful as the New Deal legislation it is designed to update. But I fear it 
won’t be. Unless its most dangerous features are arrested, the legislation 
could  permanently ensconce the worst tendencies of the regulatory 
interventions during the recent crisis as long-term regulatory policy. 
 The problem isn’t with Dodd-Frank’s two objectives. The 
objectives are right on target. The problem is with how they are handled. 
The two themes that emerge, repeatedly and unmistakably, from the two 
thousand pages of legislation are (1) government partnership with the 
largest financial institutions and (2) ad hoc intervention by regulators rather 
than a more predictable, rules-based response to crises. Each could 
dangerously distort American finance, making it more politically charged, 
less vibrant, and further removed from basic rule-of-law principles than 
ever before in modern American financial history. 
The first theme, as I just noted, is government partnership with the 
largest Wall Street banks and financial institutions. Dodd-Frank singles out 
a group of financial institutions for special treatment. The banks that meet 
the $50 billion threshold, and the nonbank financial institutions designated 
by the new Financial Stability Oversight Council as systemically important 
will be put in their own separate category. Unlike in the New Deal, there is 
no serious effort to break the largest of these banks up or to meaningfully 
scale them down. Because they are special, and because no one really 
believes the largest will be allowed to fail, they will have a competitive 
advantage over other financial institutions. They will be able to borrow 
money more cheaply, for instance, than banks that are not in the club. 
Dodd-Frank also gives regulators a variety of mechanisms they can use to 
channel political policy through the dominant institutions. The partnership 
works in both directions: special treatment for the Wall Street giants, new 
political policy levers for the government.  
The second theme overlaps with the first: Dodd-Frank enshrines a 
system of ad hoc interventions by regulators that are divorced from basic 
rule-of-law constraints. The unconstrained regulatory discretion reaches its 
zenith with the new resolution rules for financial institutions in distress. 
Dodd-Frank resolution is designed for systemically important financial 
institutions that have been singled out for special treatment. But the rules 
do not even require that an institution be designated as systemically 
important in advance. If regulators want to take over a struggling bank, they 
can simply do so as long as they can say with a straight face that it is “in 
default or in danger of default” and its default could have “serious adverse 
effects” on stability. Not only this, but they may be able to take over every 
affiliate in the bank’s network.. Once the institution is in government 
hands, the FDIC can pick and choose among creditors, deciding to pay 
some in full while leaving the rest with the dregs that remain after the 
favored creditors are paid.   
The basic expectations of the rule of law—that the rules will be 
transparent and knowable in advance, that important issues will not be left 
to the whim of regulators—are subverted by this framework. Nor is the 
tendency limited to the end-of-life issues I have been discussing. The 
Dodd-Frank Act invites ad hoc intervention with healthy financial 
institutions as well.  
The two tendencies I have just described will not come as a surprise 
to anyone who followed the legislative debates that led to the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Professor Simon 
Johnson and Nobel Prize economist Joseph Stiglitz, among others, insisted 
that the largest banks need to be broken up because they are too big to 
effectively regulate and because they distort the financial markets. I will 
refer to this perspective throughout the book as Brandeisian, in honor of 
Louis Brandeis, the Roosevelt adviser andSupreme Court justice, who 
advocated this view throughout the early twentieth century.7 
Similarly, many critics complained about the dangers of the new 
legislation’s casual disregard of the rule of law during the legislative 
debates. The contrast between the new resolution rules and the more 
predictable, transparent, rule-oriented bankruptcy process was a frequent 
subject of concern. 
The administration and advocates of the legislation did not simply 
ignore these criticisms. At several points, they were forced to make 
concessions. The most important concession is the provision now known as 
the Volcker Rule. Promoted by Paul Volcker, the popular former chairman 
of the Federal Reserve and an adviser to President Obama during the 2008 
election campaign, the Volcker Rule is a throwback to New Deal legislation 
that made it illegal to conduct commercial and investment banking under 
the same umbrella. As noted earlier, the Volcker rule prohibits commercial 
banks from engaging in proprietary trading—that is, trading and 
speculating for the bank’s own account— which is central to contemporary 
investment banking, and limits their investment in hedge funds or equity 
funds.  
Responding to criticisms that the legislation would invite a repeat of 
the ad hoc bailouts of 2008, proponents of the legislation tinkered with the 
resolution rules. This second set of concessions amended the emergency 
lending authority that the Federal Reserve used to fund the bailouts, 
transplanted several bankruptcy provisions into the Dodd-Frank resolution 
framework, and added a requirement that the institutions subject to the 
regime be liquidated. 
In theory, these concessions could give regulators the ability to rein 
in the giant financial institutions. . But , in a classic illustration of the law of 
unintended consequences, both are more likely to make the prevailing 
tendencies of the new legislation worse. Although the Volcker Rule is 
forcing banks to adjust their operations, the concept of proprietary trading 
is so slippery that its application will depend on how, and how strictly, 
regulators interpret it. This will entail an ongoing negotiation between the 
largest banks and the regulators, which could simply reinforce the 
partnership between the two, with the government softening its definition 
of proprietary in return for an implicit agreement by the banks not to shift 
their proprietary trading operations overseas. 
The adjustments that purport to end bailouts and ad hoc 
interventions will do nothing of the kind. Although the restrictions on the 
Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority are based on a valuable 
principle—that the Fed should not single out individual firms for rescue—
they will not prevent future bailouts. Regulators can pressure other 
systemically important firms to fund a bailout—as they did when the Long-
Term Capital Management hedge fund collapsed in 1998—or they can 
simply maneuver around the restrictions by creating an across-the-board 
lending facility that is really a single firm bailout in disguise. If regulators 
do take over a large financial institution under their resolution authority, 
they can evade the bankruptcy-like provisions by simply agreeing to pay 
favored creditors in full under the FDIC’s carte blanche to cherry-pick 
among creditors. 
The two central themes of the Dodd-Frank Act—government 
partnership with the largest financial institutions and ad hoc intervention—
survived the Brandeisian  concessions fully intact. 
Fannie Mae Effect 
I have made several references already to the possibility that the 
government will channel political policy through the large financial 
institutions that are singled out for special treatment. Historically, this kind 
of collaboration between the government and large businesses has been 
called corporatism. It is a familiar feature of corporate and financial 
regulation in Europe. Perhaps I should be more specific about how this 
could work in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Most pervasively, the Dodd-Frank Act invites the government to 
channel political policy through the big financial institutions by giving 
regulators sweeping discretion in the enforcement of nearly every aspect of 
the legislation. Suppose, for instance, that regulators are determining 
whether a group of Citigroup bankers are engaged in proprietary trading at 
a time when the government is unhappy with the big oil companies, or with 
weapons manufacturers. It is not hard to imagine Citigroup’s directors 
concluding that they had better limit the bank’s financing of the disfavored 
industry if they wish to get sympathetic treatment as regulators decide 
whether the bank is in compliance with the Volcker Rule. Many other 
provisions will give regulators similar leverage in their partnership with the 
largest financial institutions. 
This, of course, was how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac functioned 
under both Republican and Democratic administrations before the two 
entities collapsed and were nationalized in 2008.8 
The corporatist dimension of the legislation is further evident in the 
extraordinary authority the Dodd-Frank Act gives to the secretary of the 
Treasury and the Treasury Department. Because the Treasury secretary is 
directly responsible to the President, he is the least independent, and the 
most political, of the financial regulators. Yet the Treasury secretary is 
given leadership responsibility on the new Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and in other areas. Dodd-Frank also locates an enormous new 
research facility—the Office of Financial Research—in the Treasury 
Department. Control over knowledge is power, of course, which suggests 
that the ostensibly neutral research facility could become yet another 
channel of Treasury influence. 
Covering Their Tracks 
The special treatment of the largest firms and the reliance on ad hoc 
intervention raises a perplexing puzzle. Given that this is precisely what so 
many Americans found offensive about the bailouts of 2008 and were so 
anxious to reform, how did we end up with legislation that has such similar 
qualities? 
Perhaps the moral is that bank-government partnership and ad hoc 
intervention in a crisis are simply unavoidable. We cannot dismiss this 
possibility out of hand. In a different context—national security—several 
top legal scholars have argued that in times of national crisis, the executive 
branch of our government will inevitably take unilateral action, without 
waiting for Congress. The executive branch, they argue, is more responsive 
to the concerns of the country as a whole, and is better able to act quickly 
and decisively.9 
Perhaps financial crises are similar. The rule of law will always give 
way in a crisis. But even if it is impossible to guarantee that there will never 
be another ad hoc bailout, this reasoning doesn’t really explain Dodd-Frank 
itself. It doesn’t explain why the legislation protects the largest Wall Street 
banks, and it doesn’t explain why the legislation encourages ad hoc 
intervention, in good times as well as crises, rather than trying to make it as 
rare as possible. 
A different explanation is much more plausible: The Dodd-Frank 
Act was an opportunity for the same regulators that gave us the Bear 
Stearns and AIG bailouts to cover their tracks. The legislation was drafted 
by the same people who designed the bailout strategy, and it shows. 
When future generations look back on the origins of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, this fact may seem more amazing than any other. Consider a simple 
analogy. Every bank has two different departments for the loans it makes to 
businesses. In one department, loan officers make the loans. But if the 
borrower falls into financial distress, the loan is transferred to another 
department, the workout group. Banks do not let the original loan officer 
handle the negotiations to restructure the loan, because they suspect the 
loan officer’s judgment would be clouded by the rationales that caused the 
loan officer to make the loan at the beginning. Banks know, and have 
known for generations, that they need a fresh set of eyes after things go 
wrong. 
Dodd-Frank ignored this basic principle of sound business; it never 
had that fresh set of eyes. As I have mentioned, the main architects of the 
2008 bailouts were then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, then-head of 
the New York Fed Timothy Geithner, and Federal Reserve Chair Ben 
Bernanke. Of the three, Geithner seems to have the deepest commitment to 
ad hoc bailouts and to financial policy as a friendly negotiation between 
elite regulators and the heads of the largest banks. (Geithner’s coziness with 
the dominant banks explains why he has often been mistakenly identified as 
a former Goldman Sachs banker.) By bringing Geithner into his 
administration as Treasury secretary, President Obama ensured that the 
earlier policies would be carried into the new administration. Ben Bernanke 
still holds the same post he occupied throughout the crisis, chair of the 
Federal Reserve. Of the three, only Paulson did not have a substantial role 
in framing the new financial legislation, although he did offer his own form 
of encouragement: a memoir recounting the bailouts through a revisionist 
lens, suggesting that all he, Bernanke, and Geithner had needed were more 
regulatory powers.10 
Geithner’s Treasury Department devised a framework that attempts 
to perfect what he, Paulson, and Bernanke did in 2008. By implication, the 
new law legitimates their bailouts and covers their tracks. 
Is There Anything to Like? 
A leading banking authority recently wrote to me in an e-mail that 
the Dodd-Frank Act is the “worst piece of financial legislation” in his 
lifetime, and suggested that it is a disaster from first page to last. Is he 
correct? Does the legislation lack even the smallest worthwhile 
contributions?11 
I am not quite so pessimistic. Although the overall pattern of the 
legislation is disturbing, a handful of its contributions could genuinely 
improve the regulatory landscape. The new framework for clearing 
derivatives and trading them on exchanges is an unequivocal advance. To 
be sure, there are substantial uncertainties even here. The extent to which 
clearing and exchange trading will transform the derivatives markets for the 
better will depend, like much of Dodd-Frank, on how effectively the 
principal regulators implement the reforms—whether they ensure that most 
derivatives do in fact migrate to clearinghouses and exchanges, for 
instance, and how well they regulate the clearinghouses. But the reforms 
promise to make the derivatives markets far more transparent than in the 
past, and to diminish the risk that the default of a major financial institution 
will cause upheavals throughout the financial markets. 
A second step forward is the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau established by the legislation to serve as a consumer watchdog with 
respect to credit card and mortgage practices. Although the new bureau will 
be part of  the Federal Reserve, it will be almost completely insulated from 
second-guessing by the Fed or other bank regulators. (Only if a regulation 
could cause a systemic crisis can other regulators override the Consumer 
Bureau.) Although some critics plausibly argue that the Consumer Bureau 
has been given too much power, consumers’ interests were woefully 
underrepresented during the recent crisis. It never made sense to simply 
include consumer protection among the Fed’s other tasks, for instance, 
since the Fed’s primary concern is maintaining the stability of the banking 
system, which stands in considerable tension with consumer protection. 
Although consumer protection will still be within the Federal Reserve, it 
will be far more robust now that it is a separate operation. 
I suspect my relative optimism may stem from another factor as 
well. The effects of government partnership with the largest financial 
institutions, and of the ad hoc framework for dealing with their financial 
distress, could not be more pernicious. We may see political factors 
influencing banking decisions, which could prevent promising but 
politically unconnected industries from getting the funding they need. We 
also may see another bailout the next time a systemically important 
financial institution or important company falls into distress. But I believe 
that some of the worst tendencies of the new legislation could be curbed 
with a few very simple reforms. 
***** 
 
In the chapter that comprises Part I of the book—“Relearning the 
Financial Crisis”—I revisit two key events in the recent crisis. The first is 
the fall of Lehman. Rather than showing that bailouts are necessary and that 
bankruptcy does not work, as the conventional wisdom suggests, I argue 
that the problems caused by Lehman actually were the result of a regulatory 
bait-and-switch. With their earlier bailout of Bear Stearns, regulators had 
strongly signaled their intent to bail out any systemically important 
financial institution. But they pulled the rug out from under Lehman and its 
potential buyers by shifting course at the very last moment. The other key 
event whose significance has not been fully appreciated is the bailouts of 
Chrysler and General Motors. These bailouts were achieved first by 
appropriating funds meant for financial institutions and then by 
commandeering the bankruptcy process. The apparent success of those 
bailouts was construed by the regulators involved as a confirmation of the 
regulatory philosophy that underlies the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The heart of the book comes in Part II, Chapters 3 through 8. After 
an inside account of the legislative process, drawing on my own trips back 
and forth to and from Washington, D.C., in Chapter 3, the chapters that 
follow carefully explore each of the major planks of the new regulatory 
framework, explaining what they will do, what they mean, and what some 
of their unintended consequences may be. 
In the final part, I look to the future. The first chapter in Part III 
outlines several simple bankruptcy reforms that would curb the excesses of 
the new government-bank partnership and the reliance on ad hoc regulatory 
intervention; and the second considers ways to address international 
dimensions of the new financial order that are largely neglected by the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
Although much of the book is critical, I conclude on a note of hope. 
 
 
